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Public water systems are an integral part of community infrastructure. Drinking water 
contamination or service disruptions have the potential to cause economic losses, limit fire 
suppression capability, and result in human illnesses. Until 2016, the United States federal 
government had not issued a disaster declaration due to contaminated water. The first federal 
drinking water disaster declaration due to contaminated water serves as a sentinel event 
demonstrating the need to increase focus on public water systems during all phases of emergency 
management:  mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery. Previous studies evaluating risks 
to vulnerable populations associated with drinking water primarily utilized qualitative research 
techniques. This study compiles and analyzes data from three databases to quantitatively 
evaluate potential public water system characteristics that may lead to increased risk. Two of the 
three databases are maintained by the federal government, while the third is maintained by a 
nonprofit organization. Historically, it has been assumed that smaller systems and systems in 
disadvantaged communities would experience lower water quality. This study presents a method 
to quantitatively evaluate these types of hypotheses. This study evaluates data from public water 
systems within the states of Illinois and Texas. The results indicate that smaller water systems 
are more likely to receive regulatory violations than larger systems. In addition, the results 
suggest that communities with a higher social vulnerability index are more likely to experience 
elevated levels of nitrate. 
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What is a disaster? The Stafford Act defines major disaster as “any natural catastrophe 
(including any tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, 
volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, 
flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President 
causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under 
this Act to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and 
disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused 
thereby” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019b, p. 1). The Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) has also released a broader definition of disaster, which it defines as an “adverse 
condition or occurrence that requires coordinated action across multiple entities and/or levels of 
government to resolve” (DHS, 2017, p. 178).  
The International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) stated that the purpose of 
emergency management is to create “the framework within which communities reduce 
vulnerability to hazards and cope with disasters” (IAEM, 2007, p. 4). The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) reported that federal disaster declarations through 2015 have 
related to incidents such as terrorist attacks, fires, snowstorms, flooding, and severe storms 
(FEMA, n.d.). In 2016, a new type of disaster was declared for the first time--an incident in Flint, 
Michigan resulted in the first federal emergency declaration related to contaminated water 
(White House, 2016). The Flint incident confirmed that emergency managers may now be asked 
to consider or respond to threats to drinking water infrastructure. The new challenge for 
emergency managers is to develop techniques to optimally assess and mitigate potential hazards 




How are drinking water systems structured in the United States?  Drinking water systems 
each correspond to a regulatory classification, as depicted in Figure 1, which was originally 
published by Paine and Kushma (2017). In the United States, regulations under the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (SDWA) cover public water systems (PWSs). The SDWA excludes systems 
that do not meet the definition of a PWS. A PWS “provides water for human consumption 
through pipes or other constructed conveyances to at least 15 service connections or serves an 
average of at least 25 people for at least 60 days a year” (EPA, n.d.b, n.p.). Small systems, such 
as a household well, are not covered by the SDWA. Some schools, shopping malls, and trailer 
parks are considered PWSs. Ownership of a PWS may be either private or public. Approximately 
90% of Americans receive drinking water through a PWS (EPA, n.d.b). PWSs are further 
divided and may be classified as a community water system, a non-transient non-community 
water system (NTNCWS), or a transient non-community water system. Notably, non-PWSs and 















Drinking Water System Classification 
 
 PWSs and their regulators differentiate between two types of source water—ground 
water and surface water. This bifurcated classification of source water was created for simplicity, 
as Winter et al. (1998) have outlined how ground water and surface water interact with one 
another and therefore are, in a larger sense, part of a single resource. The precise relationships 
between source water and ground water are beyond the scope of this study. The drinking water 
industry delineates between ground water and surface water and this study follows the same 
convention. Ground water is stored in aquifers beneath the Earth’s surface and is pumped up 
through a drilled shaft for treatment. Surface water comes from lakes, reservoirs, rivers, or 
streams. Ground water is normally easier to treat because it is better protected. Surface water, 
due to excess dirt and dissolved particles, typically requires surface water treatment plants to 
have extra treatment processes (CDC, n.d.). The first extra treatment processes are coagulation 




(floc)…[then] gathering [them] together…by a process of gentle mixing” (Sacramento State, 
2017, p. 126). Another extra treatment process is sedimentation, which is the settling out of 
suspended particles.  
 The first recognition that drinking water could result in a public health disaster occurred 
in London in 1854 during a cholera outbreak. Dr. John Snow was able to pinpoint the source of 
the outbreak to a specific contaminated well (BBC, 2014). Large-scale efforts to treat water to 
prevent infection did not occur until 1908, when Jersey City became the first city to provide 
disinfection to its water supply (EPA, 2000). The U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) released 
water quality standards in 1914, although they initially only applied to “interstate carriers like 
ships and trains, and only applied to contaminants capable of causing contagious disease” (EPA, 
2000, n.p.). The USPHS updated their standards periodically, and were the de facto industry 
standard until the SDWA was enacted in 1974. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has 
attributed improvements in PWS operations as a major factor in the reduction of infectious 
diseases in the twentieth century (CDC, 1999).  
The SDWA was amended in 1986 and 1996 and remains the framework for drinking 
water quality in the United States. Initially, the SDWA was focused on water treatment although 
the later amendments expanded into “source water protection, operator training, funding for 
water system improvements, and public information” (EPA, 2004, p. 1). This law enables US 
states to assert primacy enforcement responsibility of the SDWA within their own borders. States 
and territories that do not assert primacy receive SDWA enforcement from the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  In this document, unless otherwise specified, the 
acronym Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will refer to the federal-level EPA, as 




except for Wyoming and the District of Columbia. The Navajo Nation also exerts primacy, 
although all other tribal lands receive SDWA enforcement from the EPA. 
 In addition to water quality, the federal government is in the process of implementing 
America’s Water Infrastructure Act (AWIA) of 2018, which requires water systems “serving 
more than 3,300 people to develop or update risk assessments and emergency response plans” 
(EPA, n.d.a, n.p.). A key component of the new law is to identify and mitigate potential acts of 
human malevolence. In addition, it also addresses risks associated with improper technical 
management of PWSs. The new requirements include both risk assessments and emergency 
response plans. The AWIA, in combination with the SDWA, has resulted in the generation of 
assessments, tools, and reports that could be shared with emergency managers.  
The AWIA (2018) affirmatively considers drinking water systems to be part of the 
American infrastructure. Additionally, FEMA (2019a) defined essential community lifelines as 
“those services that enable the continuous operation of critical government and business 
functions and are essential to human health and safety or economic security” (p. ii). PWSs may 
therefore be considered as both critical infrastructure and as essential community lifelines. 
PWSs, as such, have a relationship with emergency management professionals. However, the 
specific role of emergency managers with respect to PWSs remains ambiguous. This study 
explores the body of emergency management literature that may facilitate a better understanding 
of the relationship between emergency managers and PWSs.  
What defines a health hazard that must be addressed through a governmental response?  
The federal regulations that implement the SDWA (1974) defined conditions that constitute a 
health hazard in 40 CFR Part 141—National Primary Drinking Water Regulations. Additionally, 




guidance. Operators of water treatment facilities must be licensed and, as such, utilize trained 
personnel and are legally bound to protect the public. The Environmental Working Group 
(EWG), has suggested that the federal regulations are not sufficiently stringent to protect human 
health (EWG, 2019). Additionally, many communities have difficulty implementing the 
regulations. Organizations such as the National Rural Water Association work to provide 
technical assistance to these communities (NRWA, n.d.).  
Incidents involving drinking water that have the potential to impact human health occur 
on a routine basis. However, there had never been a federal emergency declaration for “water 
contamination” until 2016 (FEMA, n.d., n.p.). How have threats to drinking water historically 
been managed?  This question also applies to how current drinking water threats, which do not 
rise to the level of a declared emergency, are handled. Health advisories are issued when “water 
quality is or may be compromised” (CDC, 2016, p. 10). Alternately, a health notification is more 
serious and is triggered by specifically-defined regulatory violations or an actual disease 
outbreak (EPA, n.d.c). In some cases, natural disasters such as hurricanes or floods may severely 
damage drinking water systems. These situations will typically result in a declared emergency, 
although the emergency is not directly attributed to a degraded water system. The novel aspect of 
the Flint emergency is that contaminated water was the stated cause of the emergency 
declaration.  
The quantitative portion of this study focuses on Texas and Illinois. Why does the 
quantitative portion of this study focus on these two states?  The SDWA (1974) is enforced at the 
state level. Therefore, comparing data regarding regulatory violations across state lines may 
contribute to a loss of face-validity. Texas and Illinois were selected among the fifty states 




data. At least eight states both utilize propriety software to aggregate drinking water sampling 
data and publically display the resulting information. The eight known states are:  Texas, 
California, Louisiana, Rhode Island, Alaska, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Illinois. Texas and 
Illinois are large states, and they possess a diverse array of communities with respect to the 
Centers for Disease Control social vulnerability index (SVI). Texas and Illinois provide the 
public access to drinking water quality data associated with specific PWSs (TCEQ, n.d.; IEPA, 
n.d.).  
Problem Statement and Purpose of the Study 
 
 The broad problem that this study seeks to address is that drinking water safety is at risk 
globally although the risks are not well understood and emergency management professionals 
have not historically sought to reduce those risks. What does it mean to state that the risks are 
not well understood?  It means that meta-data has not yet been analyzed to determine the causes 
of negative PWS outcomes—increased regulatory violations or elevated contaminant levels. This 
case study seeks to quantitatively assess potential relationships between various parameters and 
negative PWS outcomes. For example, it is generally assumed that socially vulnerable 
communities would have elevated contaminants in their water. This case study seeks to 
quantitatively evaluate the data to make a determination.   
 What does it mean to state that emergency managers have not historically sought to 
reduce risks associated with PWSs?  A FEMA (n.d.) publication indicates there has never been a 
federally recognized disaster attributed to a PWS in the United States until 2016. When PWSs 
place their populations at risk, they are statutorily responsible for executing all of the risk 
communication to the public in conjunction with the primacy agency (SDWA, 1974). Absent 




emergency management professionals to participate in risk communication associated with PWS 
failures.   
 The negative outcomes that are assessed quantitatively by this case study are regulatory 
violations and elevated contaminant levels. However, this case study also discusses non-routine 
engineering upgrades that have the potential to impact the community. Currently, no databases 
are available that contain applicable meta-data associated with major engineering upgrades to 
PWSs. Therefore, incidents such as the one that occurred in Flint are reviewed from the 
qualitative, rather than the quantitative, perspective. The Flint disaster occurred during a major 
project to procure raw water from a different source—it was not initiated through the failure of 
existing procedures and equipment.  Research for this case study did not identify any other recent 
examples of a city the size of Flint changing its source of raw water on a compressed timeline.    
 All aspects of potential risks to the water supply are worthy of evaluation by emergency 
managers. Meta-data, when available, can be evaluated to assess risks. In addition, when 
engineering projects fail, such as in Flint, they should be qualitatively evaluated to seek lessons 
learned. This paper evaluates both quantitative and qualitative data to identify methods to reduce 
risk during mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Emergency managers in the present 
and future may be concerned with all risks to their communities, including risks associated with 
PWSs.  
 Integration of the mitigation and preparedness phases of emergency management 
associated with PWSs has been addressed by a number of EPA publications. A primary method 
of mitigating disasters associated with PWSs is to assure that water operators have proper 
training and certification. The system of training and certification is non-standard in that each 




Programs which helps explain the complicated system, although there are no plans to reduce 
complexity within the system (EPA, 2016b). Drinking water operators work with professional 
engineers, whose certifications are also issued at the state-level. Mitigation and preparedness 
tools also include a variety of checklists issued by the EPA, such as the Incident Action 
Checklist--Flooding (EPA, 2015a).   
 Response and recovery to PWS disasters remain largely under the regulatory umbrella of 
the SDWA.  In this sense, PWSs and primacy agencies follow the SDWA rather than regulations 
that flow through emergency management channels. However, the federal government has issued 
non-binding guidance on how PWSs and emergency managers are able to increase 
communication and work more closely together (EPA, 2018). For example, the EPA (2018) 
publication Connecting Water Utilities and Emergency Management Agencies recommends how 
PWSs and emergency managers can increase information sharing.  
The introduction to this study provided an overview of PWSs and how non-emergency 
managers have historically provided risk reduction techniques. The introduction also included 
the stated goals of emergency managers and demonstrated that reducing risk associated with 
PWSs is included within the scope of emergency management. There are a number of technical 
and administrative problems that contribute to increased risk associated with PWSs. However, 
the main problem that this study is addressing is the emergent nature of the relationship between 
emergency management and PWSs.   
 This study is predicated on the assumption that the current level of risk to drinking water 
is sufficient to justify a maturation of the relationship between emergency management and 
PWSs. It is possible that, due to issues such as aging infrastructure, PWSs may face increased 




and drinking water risk. If social vulnerability is related to risk, then future trends associated 
with social vulnerability may increase the need for improved relationships between emergency 
managers and PWSs. Overall, future trends associated with drinking water risk are likely to be 
jurisdiction-dependent. For example, the state of California, through Senate Bill 1398 (2016), are 
pursuing legislation to eliminate all lead service lines within their border. 
 The nature and quantity of resources and methodologies by which communities mitigate, 
prepare, respond, and recover from drinking water-related emergencies is evolving. This research 
effort is a case study to identify potential methods of reducing risks associated with PWSs. The 
first goal is to quantitatively evaluate meta-data, focusing on two particular states, to potentially 
identify relationships that may facilitate risk assessments of PWSs. The second goal is to conduct 
a review of existing literature related to emergency management in order to ascertain existing 
mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery techniques and strategies. In addition to the 
academic publications such as those cited in this study, the literature includes 
governmental resources. A preliminary pull of governmental documents to prepare this study 
resulted in the identification of 212 relevant resources totaling 6,761 pages. Example tiles of 
these documents include Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (DHS & EPA, 2019), Inventory of EPA’s Tools for Enhancing Community 
Resilience to Disasters (EPA, 2016a), and Connecting Water Utilities and Emergency 
Management Agencies (EPA, 2018).  
Significance of the Study 
 
  The four phases of emergency management are mitigation, preparedness, response, and 




expressed in the literature, by which both PWSs and emergency managers engage throughout 
each phase of emergency management. An overview of these methods may assist emergency 
managers developing plans for their communities. In addition, three diverse datasets were 
quantitatively assessed. This case study performed data analyses to explore potential 
improvements to conducting vulnerability assessments. Meta-data from the existing large 
datasets has not been widely analyzed. An exception was reported by Fedinick et al. (2019), who 
evaluated the data from a social justice perspective. If relationships are identified among key 
variables within the present study, then future research could be conducted to better explore the 
phenomena.  
 This study aimed to identify existing techniques that emergency managers and water 
utilities utilize to reduce risk throughout the four phases of emergency management.  Areas for 
increased collaboration were also identified.  According to the SDWA (1974), PWSs assume 
primary responsibility for all four phases of emergency management while primacy agencies 
provide oversight. In the future, emergency managers may need to respond when public utilities 
and primacy agencies fail in their basic duty to protect consumers.  Increased collaboration 
between emergency managers and PWSs may facilitate better outcomes for communities.   
 The incident in Flint, Michigan, was somewhat of a unique case, not just in the 
magnitude of the impact on the community, but also in the sense that the proximate cause was a 
switch to a new type of source water.  This is not a frequent occurrence, as research for this case 
study did not find any other recent examples of a PWS serving nearly 100,000 persons switching 
their water source on a compressed timeline.  While there is nothing inherently illegal or 
improper about switching water sources, the project in Flint resulted in criminal charges against 




perspective, and there was also an apparent cover-up that prevented earlier detection of the 
failure (Egan, 2015).  The apparent cover-up involved the state-level primacy agency as well as 
the local PWS, which was also under management of the state government (Egan, 2015).  
This case study is based, in part, on the assumption that there is room for improvement in 
how communities manage such projects. Federal and applicable state regulations stipulate the 
responsible parties in such projects—and it’s not emergency managers. This study, in accordance 
with supporting literature, is based on the assumption that emergency managers can, however, 
play some role, as opposed to no role. This study seeks to better delineate what that role may 
entail with respect to mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.  
 This case study considers different types of drinking water-related emergencies that may 
occur.  Some water-related emergencies do not result in declared emergencies. These types of 
incidents therefore not require immediate public notification. This may occur, for example, when 
water sampling indicates a parameter exceeds a trigger level. Public reporting of these incidents 
typically occurs once per year in the annual Consumer Confidence Report, as opposed to real-
time notification.  The next type of incident requires immediate public notification, but will not 
result in a declaration of emergency. An example would be significant contamination levels 
resulting from a backflow incident or operational error. An example of a third type of water-
related emergency is a natural disaster that tangentially threatens the drinking water supply, for 
example through damaged infrastructure or flooding. Flint, Michigan, was an example of a new 
type of emergency—a declared emergency specifically relating to drinking water contamination.  
Historically, drinking water incidents have not been managed under the auspices of 
emergency management. Instead, the framework for mitigation, preparation, response, and 




of the SDWA. Governmental publications and academic literature have emerged over the 
decades that allude to a more comprehensive approach to reducing risk associated with public 
water supplies. The EPA has directly made some recommendations on how emergency managers 
and PWSs can better work together (EPA, 2018). This case study operated on the premise that 
ambiguity remains as to how emergency managers can best facilitate reductions in risk to their 
water supplies.  
 Emergency managers have, as discussed in the introduction, not historically been 
participants in risk reduction efforts related to drinking water systems. In 2016, a federal disaster 
was declared due to contaminated water. Given the stated purpose of emergency management 
cited in the introduction, emergency managers cannot ignore disasters related to drinking water. 
A key problem is that emergency management-related techniques to address drinking water 
systems are still emerging. This paper seeks to utilize both quantitative and qualitative 
techniques to ascertain how emergency managers can more successfully mitigate, prepare, 
respond, and recover to drinking water incidents.  
 The academic literature, as well as government documents, provide information 
regarding risk reduction associated with drinking water systems (EPA, 2014b; Switzer & 
Teodoro, 2018).  In addition, large data sets of drinking water-related data are publicly available, 
from both public and private sources. This case study reviews the literature and quantitatively 
assesses the datasets. This study provides an overview of the literature as well as an outline of 
the methodology by which the quantitative data can be analyzed.  
Why is this study going to focus on data from Texas and Illinois?  The SDWA is 
enforced at the state level. Therefore, comparing data regarding regulatory violations across state 




software to aggregate drinking water sampling data and publically display the resulting 
information. The eight known states are:  Texas, California, Louisiana, Rhode Island, Alaska, 
New Jersey, North Carolina, and Illinois. Texas and California are the largest states, and 
therefore provide the most data points. Texas was selected for this study instead of California for 
two reasons. First, it possesses a more diverse array of communities with respect to the Centers 
for Disease Control SVI. Second, Texas provides more public information regarding its drinking 
water program. The availability of additional information is likely to enhance the analysis of 
quantitative findings. Illinois was selected because of its healthy mix of ground water and 
surface water.  
The Role of Environmental Justice 
 The body of environmental justice literature relating to drinking water and its associated 
infrastructure has been growing in recent years (Fedinick et al., 2019; Switzer & Teodoro, 2018; 
Balazs & Ray, 2014). The 2016 Flint, Michigan disaster appears to have been a focusing event 
which provided increased attention to drinking water systems among researchers. A number of 
these studies have particular relevance to social vulnerability and drinking water systems. Two 
parameters were the focus of these studies. First, regulatory violations were analyzed. Second, 
data associated with drinking water contaminants was studied. The results associated with these 
two parameters were then compared with various indicators of social vulnerability such as race, 
income, language spoken, or SVI. The CDC formally defines SVI as “the potential negative 
effects on communities caused by external stresses on human health” (ATSDR, n.d., n.p.).  
 Fedinick et al. (2019) published the results of a multi-organizational study that researched 
the linkage between drinking water violations and factors associated with vulnerability. The 




the quantitative data. The primary conclusion was that regulatory “violations were more likely in 
counties with racial, ethnic, and language vulnerability and subpar housing and transportation 
quality” (p. 35). An article by Fedinick et al. (2019) was one of the few environmental justice 
articles that specifically noted that distribution systems, in addition to treatment systems, require 
attention with respect to risk mitigation efforts.  
 Switzer and Teodoro (2018) touched on a subject that may benefit from an expanded 
analysis: local management of drinking water systems. Much like school districts, funding is 
primarily local even if funding from higher levels of government may be available as a 
supplement. In this sense, there is no federal or state-level drinking water system. States provide 
regulatory oversight over systems, but they do not own or operate the systems. Switzer and 
Teodoro (2018) discussed the implications of the local nature of PWSs. In addition, they 
specifically addressed the issue of which specific parameters of social vulnerability were most 
influential with respect to drinking water: class and race.  
 Several environmental justice articles (McDonald & Jones, 2018; Balazs & Ray, 2014) 
discussed governmental interfaces with PWSs. The structure of local governments, funding 
schemes, and oversight procedures all contribute to the overall effectiveness of PWSs.  
McDonald and Jones (2018) included a discussion of EPA involvement with environmental 
justice.  Additionally, they discussed Government Accountability Office efforts and 
recommendations to improve accuracy of the EPA Safe Drinking Water Information System 
(SDWIS) (General Accountability Office, 2011).  Balazs and Ray (2014), proposed a “Drinking 
Water Disparities Framework” as an archetype for the drinking water industry (p. 603). The 
Balazs and Ray model centered PWSs within three different types of environments: the natural 




 All of the articles reviewed in this section, with the exception of Switzer and Teodoro 
(2018), directly addressed the role of system size (as measured by population served) with 
respect to negative outcomes for drinking water systems. In each case, small systems were noted 
for having limited access to what Balazs et al. (2012) termed “technical, managerial and financial 
(TMF) capacity” (p. 9). Balazs et al. (2011), in a study involving nitrate concentrations, found 
that “[f]or large systems, we did not find significant associations between race/ethnicity or home 
ownership and nitrate levels” (p. 1276). This is interesting, in that it suggested that larger 
systems may be able to overcome challenges associated with increased social vulnerability 
through TMF capacity. This case study considers SVI as one potential factor of negative 
outcomes, and it also evaluates other potential sources of negative outcomes.      
The negative outcomes that were quantitatively measured in the environmental justice 
studies were of two general types: regulatory violations or contaminant levels. Balazs et al. 
(2011) explicitly discussed, in reference to “both components of environmental justice,” 
“compliance challenges as well as exposure to contaminants” (p. 2). There are multiple types of 
regulatory violations, some of which are health-based and others which are not. For example, a 
violation could be issued for failure to make proper notifications of certain events. In addition to 
contaminants, a number of physical parameters may be water quality indicators. For example, 
turbidity and pH are not contaminants but they do impact drinking water quality. All of the 
studies evaluated restricted their analysis to contaminants, which are defined by 20 CFR part 141 
(2021) as “any physical, chemical, biological, or radiological substance or matter in water.”  This 
case study uses the convention of other studies, and focuses on indicators, rather than restricting 





Relationships between Water Utilities and Emergency Managers 
The EPA has published multiple documents to assist PWSs with respect to disasters. For 
example, a guide to mitigating against floods has been released (EPA, 2014b). Flooding is a 
relatively common occurrence and it may occur simultaneously with a major natural disaster that 
forces resources to be dispersed throughout the community. In addition, the AWIA guidance can 
be used to identify potential threats which require mitigation (EPA, 2019a). Additional guidance 
on potential mitigation requirements can be found in other documentation, such as the System 
Measures of Water Distribution System Resilience (EPA, 2015b). 
 In this document, unless otherwise specified, the acronym Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) will refer to the federal-level EPA, as opposed to state-level equivalent agencies. 
The EPA has published a guide for how “water utilities and emergency management agencies 
can work together to better respond to emergencies” (EPA, 2018, p.1). This document primarily 
gave suggestions on how water utilities and emergency managers can develop relationships to 
facilitate collaboration during responses. For example, joint participation in training exercises 
and tours of each other’s facilities were recommended. Shared administrative processes were 
also discussed, such as providing water utilities space in emergency operations centers and 
providing responder access badges to utility workers. Joint effort on emergency communication 
to the public was also suggested.  
 The EPA (2018) also recommended joint planning to assist both in the mitigation and 
preparedness phases of emergency management. This included sharing emergency response 
plans, emergency operations plans, and county hazard mitigation plans. The focus of joint 
planning efforts is to manage emergency water scenarios, with a particular focus on alternate 




management. For example, if a water utility identifies a particular vulnerability, then funding 
sources could be pursued as a team.  
 Primacy agencies are typically run by state governments, normally through the equivalent 
of a state-level EPA. Such agencies may have a variety of names, such as Department of 
Environmental Protection or Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA has published 
guidance for state-level EPAs to mitigate, prepare, respond, and recover from water-related 
emergencies (EPA, 2013b). Mitigation guidance is geared toward utilizing existing funding 
opportunities. However, no recommended methods of identifying hazards were suggested in the 
document. For example, there was no recommendation to utilize data from sanitary surveys to 
feed into the mitigation process. The remainder of the suggestions in the 2013 EPA guidance 
related to developing specific response and recovery plans and checklists.  
 The EPA (EPA, 2014a) has provided some guidance regarding how to implement 
physical security measures to defend against malicious tampering with the water supply. Basic 
recommendations included fencing, locks, and proper lighting. Enhanced guidance was provided 
to assist water utilities to implement the AWIA.  Later, the EPA (2019a; 2019b) produced 
additional guidance to protect against malevolent acts against PWSs.  This recent guidance was 
more comprehensive in that it covered all aspects of security, including natural disasters and 
cyber-attacks. The EPA also supported a Water Network Tool for Resilience that assists with all 
aspects of maintaining operations at a PWS (Klise et al., 2017). Guidance has also been 
published regarding remote sensing of water systems as early warning for contamination (EPA, 
2016a).  
  The federal government provides substantial guidance for the response phase of 




Checklist” for flooding (EPA, 2015a, p. 1). Additionally, guidance is available for the emergency 
disinfection of water (EPA, 2017). If proper planning is completed, then the response phase of a 
water emergency can be straightforward. Difficulty may arise, however, when communities do 
not properly plan or if they plan for the wrong scenarios. In addition to responding to 
emergencies, proper communication to the public is critical. The CDC has published guidance to 
assist PWSs with this type of communication (CDC, 2016).  
 On June 4, 2019, the EPA and FEMA released a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
to address funding associated with PWSs after a disaster (EPA, 2019b). The primary goal of the 
MOU was to increase the speed with which funding is made available to the community to begin 
recovering. Previously, the money would have needed to be fronted; then, assistance could be 
applied for after the fact. The new arrangement quickly makes loans available to pay for 
recovery. The loans must be matched by the state. The partnership between the EPA and FEMA 
works through the existing framework of state revolving funds, which are depicted schematically 
in Figure 2.  
 The EPA Clean Water State Revolving Fund (CWSRF) was authorized by the Clean 
Water Act amendments (1987). The CWSRF made two fundamental changes to the way the 
federal government assisted funding of local water projects. First, instead of grants, the program 
began issuing primarily loans. Second, states were placed in charge of managing their programs 
instead of the federal government. Federal funds were applied to the programs, then states fund a 
20% match. The EPA refers to “51 state-level infrastructure ‘banks’” that issue loans for projects 











Large technical systems (LTSs) consist of infrastructure that enable “a myriad of social 
changes, for good or worse” (Van der Vleuten, 2004, p. 396).  LTSs are large-scale networks 
responsible for functions such as power production or the provision of drinking water (Roe et al., 
2004). LTSs encompass multiple organizations and are not represented by a single project, 
company, or governmental entity. Anticipation, recognition, evaluation, and control of risk 
within an LTS requires analysis of technical, social, and organizational factors (Kleiner et al., 
2015).    
LTSs are multi-organizational institutions that provide vital services to the societies that 




of LTS.  LTSs require an established cadre of reliability professionals to assure reliability on 
behalf of the public (Perrow, 1999). Several theories, such as normal accident theory (NAT) and 
high reliability theory (HRT) have developed to analyze and assure the reliability of LTSs.  NAT 
theorizes that failures are inevitable while HRT suggests that failures can be largely prevented 
(Perrow, 1994, La Porte, 1994).  The failure of a drinking water system can result in a public 
emergency, as evidenced by the 2016 disaster in Flint, Michigan. Trained reliability 
professionals are required to mitigate, prepare, respond, and recover from emergencies.  
Drinking water utilities, similar to fires, present potential risk to communities. However, 
fires are much more likely to result in declarations of emergency when they cause extensive 
damage. This literature review discusses the role of water utilities within the framework of 
disasters. Drinking water systems may result in disaster when they are disrupted, contaminated 
from the source, or during backflow incidents. Each phase of emergency management must be 
considered with respect to drinking water systems.   
The design, maintenance, and oversight of LTSs requires a diverse cadre of reliability 
professionals. Reliability professionals may have requirements such as education, training, 
experience, or professional certification. Building codes, legal requirements, and professional 
codes of ethics are some of the structures which govern reliability professionals that work with 
LTSs. A duty to protect the public safety is inherent in these professions, and failures may entail 
severe consequences. Examples of reliability professionals within the drinking water industry 
include professional engineers, governmental regulators, and drinking water system operators.      
 A partial meltdown of a nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island in Middletown, 
Pennsylvania in 1979 was “the most serious accident in U.S. commercial nuclear power plant 




at Three Mile Island: The Human Dimensions (Sills et al., 1981) on the human aspects of the 
situation was published.  Two contributors to the book, Charles Perrow and Todd La Porte, later 
developed different theories relating risk reduction within LTSs (Rijpma, 1997). Perrow (1994) 
focused on the framework within which LTSs operate and La Porte (1994) worked toward 
techniques to minimize risk.       
 Perrow (1999) proposed the Normal Accident Theory (NAT) in a text regarding safety 
risks of LTSs. Perrow (1999) viewed the occurrence of accidents as a normal part of an LTS 
lifecycle. Perrow considered two attributes of LTSs as being directly proportional to their risk 
level: complexity and tight coupling. Complex systems are difficult to understand, manage, and 
control. Tightly coupled systems enable errors to quickly compound when problems emerge. 
According to Perrow, LTSs that are complex and tightly coupled will inevitably result in 
periodic failures.  
 La Porte, working with a team at the University of California, Berkeley, developed what 
later became known as HRT (Rijpma, 1997).  Their initial progress stemmed from case studies 
among the air traffic control system, electric power generation, and naval operations (Morgan, 
2017). Christianson et al. (2011) distilled the five main tenants of highly reliable organizations: 
“preoccupation with failure…, reluctance to simplify…, sensitivity to operations…, resilience…, 
and deference to expertise” (p. 314).  
The Flint, Michigan drinking water crisis was an example of an LTS failure. The disaster 
demonstrated, for the first time, that impaired drinking water quality may result in a declared 
emergency. Drinking water quality may be compromised by a variety of threats. Threats may 
include the following:  natural disasters, seasonal weather changes, failure to conduct proper 




disasters may increase the risk to water systems through large-scale flooding and industrial-scale 
contaminant releases. The methods by which drinking water risk reduction is incorporated into 
the four phases of emergency management are still emerging.  
Theoretical analysis of the breakdown of LTSs can be performed through both NAT and 
HRT. NAT and HRT were developed in the 1980s, and continued to be refined in the 1990s and 
beyond. NAT holds that accidents are inevitable in systems that are complex and tightly coupled. 
HRT attempts to work in a complement with NAT and seeks to reduce risk to the greatest degree 
possible. The drinking water industry has existing methods of mitigating, preparing, responding, 
and recovering from disasters. Increasing relationships and information-sharing between water 
utilities and emergency managers may reduce risk in the future.  
Methods  
The existing literature associated with both drinking water infrastructure and 
environmental justice have informed this case study. Quantitative analysis of environmental 
justice has become simplified through the development of the SVI. This study differs in its 
quantitative analysis from previous research in four different ways. First, parameters for 
violations are analyzed on both a raw and a per-capita basis. Second, this case study 
encompasses two entire states and will exclude data from outside of those states. Studies cited in 
the literature have typically analyzed either national data or localities smaller than a state. Data is 
restricted to the state-level in this study because enforcement primacy and other significant 
water-related programs operate at the state level. Third, this case study analyzes factors such as 
source water type, number of regulatory site visits, and utilize multiple measures of system size. 
In particular, analyses are performed for system size both based on PWS population served and 




regulatory compliance and contaminant levels.  No Institutional Review Board approvals were 
required for this case study, as there was no research involving human or animal test subjects.  
Methodology 
 
The purpose of this case study was to identify methods of risk reduction associated with 
drinking water emergencies and disasters. A qualitative review of the literature was conducted to 
identify existing emergency management techniques to mitigate, prepare, respond, and recover 
from incidents. Additionally, a dataset has been compiled from portions of three large data 
repositories. The dataset has been quantitatively analyzed to determine potential relationships 
that could enhance water-related risk reduction efforts. The conclusion of the case study reveals 
both implications and areas of future research.    
This case study was based upon the conceptual framework in Figure 3 that describes 
relationships between key nodes associated with drinking water infrastructure. The conceptual 
framework is presented in Figure 3. PWSs treat raw water, whether ground or surface water, and 
are overseen by regulators. PWSs produce potable water for consumers. Potable water is not 
pure, and normally contains low levels of contaminants. PWSs may generate regulatory 
violations, by producing excess levels of contaminants or by other actions such as improper 
management. The communities that consume water from a PWS may be characterized based 
upon their social vulnerability. This case study utilized the CDC SVI as the measure of social 













 PWSs are part of the American infrastructure, and they are responsible for delivering 
potable water to communities. Disruption to the supply of potable water may indirectly result 
from disasters. However, disruption to the supply of potable water caused by a PWS could also 
independently create an emergency. The conceptual framework provides a simplified overview 
of the parameters that may be related to PWS risk levels. This study utilized three existing 
databases to evaluate the relationship between each of the parameters and negative outcomes.    
Research Question 
 
 How can emergency managers improve risk reduction efforts associated with drinking 







Hypotheses Group 1: Social Vulnerability 
The first group of hypotheses tests whether there is a relationship between social 
vulnerability and ten other factors. Each of those relationships has a separate null hypothesis, 
listed below. (Hypotheses with an asterisk* only apply for PWSs with a population of 10,000 or 
greater due to limited data availability.) The ten null hypotheses are as follows: 
• There is no relationship between SVI and population served. 
• There is no relationship between SVI and quantity of regulator site visits. 
• There is no relationship between SVI and quantity of regulator site visits per capita. 
• There is no relationship between SVI and regulatory violations. 
• There is no relationship between SVI and regulatory violations per capita. 
• There is no relationship between SVI and number of contaminants exceeding health  
• guidelines*. 
• There is no relationship between SVI and levels of chloroform*. 
• There is no relationship between SVI and levels of disinfection byproducts*. 
• There is no relationship between SVI and levels of nitrate*. 
• There is no relationship between SVI and levels of arsenic*. 
The null hypotheses were created to test the relationship between SVI and other factors. The 
formulation of the null hypotheses is not intended to prejudge whether the hypotheses will be 
accepted or rejected. Social vulnerability could possibly be related to the attention of regulators 
and therefore water quality. Regulator attention can be tracked based on the number of site visits 
made to each PWS. It is also possible to track and analyze the number of regulatory violations 




vulnerability. It is not possible to fully determine the impact of social vulnerability on regulatory 
attention or water quality without quantitatively evaluating the data.  
Regulator attention to PWSs can be evaluated though the use of metrics. Regulatory 
violations track identified problems attributed to a PWS. It is possible that vulnerable 
communities have more violations due to lack of ability to self-fund their PWSs. However, it is 
also possible that vulnerable communities have fewer violations because regulators do not bother 
to show up to their facilities in order to provide an evaluation. There is no available data to track 
violations that were not identified by regulators. However, it is possible to track the number of 
regulatory visits that were received by each PWS. A quantitative analysis will determine the 
relationship between community vulnerability and the both number of regulatory site visits and 
the number of violations.  
Water quality data is available and can be analyzed based on the associated social 
vulnerability index. However, until the data is analyzed it is not possible to know if any 
relationships exist. It is possible that vulnerable communities have lower water quality. 
However, it is also possible that wealthy areas have worse water quality. Poor water quality may 
be an indicator of a current or past industrial base that provides (or provided) a robust economy. 
In that case, poor water quality may essentially be a tradeoff for a more favorable social 
vulnerability index. It is also possible that due to regulations all communities have a similar level 
of water quality.  
Hypotheses Group 2: Source Water Type 
The second group of hypotheses tests whether there is a relationship between source 




listed below. (Parameters with an asterisk* only apply for PWSs with a population of 10,000 or 
greater due to limited data availability.) The nine null hypotheses are as follows: 
• There is no relationship between source water type and quantity of regulator site visits. 
• There is no relationship between source water type and quantity of regulator site visits 
per capita. 
• There is no relationship between source water type and number of violations. 
• There is no relationship between source water type and number of violations per capita. 
• There is no relationship between source water type and number of contaminants 
exceeding health guidelines*. 
• There is no relationship between source water type and levels of chloroform*. 
• There is no relationship between source water type and levels of disinfection 
byproducts*. 
• There is no relationship between source water type and Levels of nitrate*. 
• There is no relationship between source water type and levels of arsenic*. 
 Only 2.5% of Earth’s water is freshwater (United States Geological Survey, n.d.). 
“Precipitation is the ultimate source of all fresh-water resources, [although] most of it never 
enters an aquifer or runs off into a stream” (Foster, 1988, p. 6). A significant portion of 
precipitation is evaporated back into the atmosphere and much of it is also captured by 
vegetation and then released through transpiration. Precipitation that saturates below the water 
table is available for use as ground water.  
 It is possible that ground water will have fewer contaminants and fewer violations 
because it is better protected from the environment. However, it is also possible that modern 




is also possible that because surface water is more complex to treat that those systems will be 
more prone to regulatory violations.  
Hypotheses Group 3: PWS System Size (measured by population served) 
The third group of hypotheses tests whether there is a relationship between PWS system 
size (measured by population served) and ten other factors. Each of those relationships has a 
separate null hypothesis, listed below. (Parameters with an asterisk* only apply for PWSs with a 
population of 10,000 or greater due to limited data availability). The ten null hypotheses are as 
follows:   
• There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by population served) and 
quantity of regulator site visits. 
• There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by population served) and 
quantity of regulator site visits per capita. 
• There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by population served) and 
number of violations. 
• There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by population served) and 
number of violations per capita. 
• There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by population served) and 
social vulnerability index. 
• There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by population served) and 
number of contaminants exceeding health guidelines* 
• There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by population served) and 




• There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by population served) and 
levels of disinfection byproducts* 
• There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by population served) and 
levels of nitrate* 
• There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by population served) and 
Levels of arsenic* 
 Larger PWSs typically have access to more resources and larger technical staffs. It is 
therefore possible that larger PWSs therefore have higher water quality and fewer regulatory 
violations. Several metrics are available to determine the size of a system. The population served 
is one determinant of the size of a PWS. It is possible, given a common regulatory framework, 
that all systems will produce a similar quality of water. It is also possible that the size of a system 
is unrelated to the number of regulatory violations.  
Hypotheses Group 4: PWS System Size (measured by number of facilities) 
The fourth group of hypotheses tests whether there is a relationship between PWS system 
size measured by number of facilities) and ten other factors. Each of those relationships has a 
separate null hypothesis, listed below. (Parameters with an asterisk* only apply for PWSs with a 
population of 10,000 or greater due to limited data availability.) The ten null hypotheses are as 
follows:   
• There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by number of facilities) and 
Quantity of regulator site visits 
• There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by number of facilities) and 




• There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by number of facilities) and 
Number of violations 
• There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by number of facilities) and 
Number of violations per capita 
• There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by number of facilities) and 
Social vulnerability index 
• There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by number of facilities) and 
Number of contaminants exceeding health guidelines* 
• There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by number of facilities) and 
Levels of chloroform* 
• There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by number of facilities) and 
Levels of disinfection byproducts* 
• There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by number of facilities) and 
Levels of nitrate* 
• There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by number of facilities) and 
Levels of arsenic* 
 Larger PWSs typically have access to more resources and larger technical staffs. It is 
therefore possible that larger PWSs therefore have higher water quality and fewer regulatory 
violations. Several metrics are available to determine the size of a system. The number of 
facilities is one determinant of the size of a PWS. Additionally, the population served is another 








  The quantitative data set for this project was compiled from three separate sources. The 
first data source, providing information on PWSs, is the EPA SDWIS. Second, the EWG Tap 
Water Database contains information regarding water quality. Third, the CDC SVI is published 
to characterize communities across the United States. Data from all three sources were compiled 
to enable quantitative analysis to evaluate the hypotheses set forth in this study.  
Quantitative Analyses to be Performed 
Source Water Type vs Parameters 
 This analysis is based on a two-tail z-test for comparing two means. Steps are as follows: 
• Step 1:  Determine descriptive statics:  average, median, standard deviation, number of 
samples 
• Step 2:  Select a significance level (α) 
o Note:  This study utilizes α = 0.05 
• Step 3:  Calculate the z-score, where:  
 
o z = z-score  
o x₁ = mean of sample 1 
o x₂ = mean of sample 2 
o Δ = hypothesized difference between means (0 if testing null hypothesis) 
o σ₁  = standard deviation of population 1 
o σ₂  = standard deviation of population 2 




o n₂ = size of population 2 
• Step 4: Determine probability from a z-table and multiply by two, because the test is two-
tailed.  
• Step 5:  Compare the probability to the significance level. If the probability is less than 
the significance level, then the null hypothesis is rejected. Otherwise, the null hypothesis 
fails to be rejected.  
Social Vulnerability, PWS Population, and PWS Number of Facilities vs Parameters 
This analysis is based on Pearson’s correlation coefficient, used to measure the 
relationship between two variables.  Steps are as follows: 
• Step 1:  Determine descriptive statics:  average, median, standard deviation, number of 
samples 
• Step 2:  Select a significance level (α) 
o α = 0.05 
• Step 3:  Calculate Pearson correlation coefficient (r) 
o Note: use “PEARSON” function in Microsoft Excel 
• Step 4:  Determine number of pairs of data (n) 
• Step 5:  Calculate degrees of freedom (n-2) 
• Step 6:  Calculate the t-statistic (t) 
 
o t = t-statistic  
o r = Pearson correlation coefficient 




• Step 7: Determine the probability p-value (p) 
o Note: use “TDIST” function in Microsoft Excel (within Excel x = t and input 2 
tails) 
• Step 8:  Compare the probability to the significance level. If the probability is less than 
the significance level, then the null hypothesis is rejected. Otherwise, the null hypothesis 
fails to be rejected.  
Expected Outcome 
 This case study seeks to identify potential resources and methodologies by which 
communities may collectively improve their ability to mitigate, prepare, respond, and recover 
from drinking water-related emergencies. It is proposed that gaps may be identified. It might also 
be possible that areas for increased collaboration between emergency managers and the drinking 
water industry will be identified. The quantitative analyses are expected to determine the utility 
of water industry meta-data. If relationships between key variables are identified, then risk-
reduction recommendations could be generated or future research opportunities could be 
proposed. 
Limitations 
 There are a number of limitations that apply to this case study. First, the literature review 
and the databases that form the basis of the quantitative portion of this study are limited to 
publicly available resources. Second, the databases that are utilized as part of the study each have 
internal limitations. For example, the SDWIS database relies on input from state-level regulators. 
Third, the researcher did not have access to internal stakeholders within PWSs, state regulatory 
agencies, or federal agencies. These limitations are likely to contribute to the need for further 





The methods of this case study are designed to answer the research question:  How can 
emergency managers improve risk reduction efforts associated with drinking water infrastructure 
through analysis of practices and meta-data within the emergency management literature?  In 
order to frame the question, a conceptual framework is presented. The conceptual framework 
visually displays the relationships between PWSs and both their dependent and independent 
variables. A description of source information is then provided. First, it is acknowledged that the 
answer to the research question stems from the work of previous scholarly output. In addition, 
quantitative data sources from three databases are described. The remainder of the methodology 
section describes how the source materials could be used to answer the research question.  
The methods section describes the compilation of the data set. The source data is derived 
from three different databases. An EPA database lists groundwater type, number of violations, 
and size-related data associated with each PWS. A database from a non-profit organization 
provides data regarding water quality for each large PWS serving over 10,000 consumers. A 
third database is provided by the CDC to identify the SVI of the county in which each PWS is 
located. A single database was compiled to merge data from each of the three listed databases.  
The hypotheses are presented as well as the statistical techniques that are used to evaluate 
the data. The presentation of the hypotheses provides an overview of potential relationships 
between variables. The display of the statistical techniques discloses the methods by which the 
data is analyzed. The presentation of the hypotheses and quantitative analysis techniques may 
facilitate future studies that could be conducted to build upon this case study. The expected 




in the future. The methods section also includes a discussion of the limitations of the study.  All 
computations were performed using Microsoft Excel.   
Quantitative Results 
 Quantitative results were produced for two different states:  Illinois and Texas. The 
results are presented below, based on the independent variables. The availability of results from 
two different states helps illuminate the relationships between the respective dependent and 
independent variables. Future studies may expand on the datasets to include all states, territories, 
and tribal lands. Many of the relationships between variables were consistent between Illinois 
and Texas, although some diverged.  
Hypothesis 1: Social Vulnerability Index vs Parameters 
Table 1 
Hypothesis Group 1:  Social Vulnerability Index v. Parameters 
 
Note. *Large systems serve 10,000 or more consumers. 
          SVI was first evaluated in comparison to the PWS population served. In the state of 
Illinois, a larger population served was proportional to a higher SVI. For Illinois, the p-value for 
the Pearson’s correlation coefficient test was 6.48 * 10-9. In contrast, the p-value for the 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient test for Texas was 0.23, which is not statistically significant. 







Quantity reguator site visits All Yes Proportional Yes Proportional
Regulator site visits per capita All No None No None
Quantity regulatory violations All Yes Proportional Yes Proportioanl
Regulatory violations per capita All No None Yes Proportional
Number of contaminants exceeding health guidelines Large* Yes Proportional No None
Levels of arsenic Large* No None Yes Proportional
Levels of chloroform Large* No None No None
Levels of nitrate Large* Yes Porportional Yes Proportional










SVI is more evenly distributed based on population size. In other words, poverty and other social 
ills may be more concentrated in Illinois than in Texas. Given the difference between the results 
from different states, the suggestion is that some states may have a relationship between 
population served and SVI, while others do not. Future research that evaluates data on a national 
level might more definitely delineate the relationship between population served and SVI.  
          SVI was next compared to the quantity of regulator site visits as well as the quantity of 
regulator site visits per capita. Initially, it was not known whether elevated SVI would correlate 
to more attention from regulators. Would regulators provide more attention to well-off areas or 
disadvantaged areas?  The data regarding the total number of site vests indicated that higher SVI 
communities receive more visits. The p-value for the Pearson’s correlation coefficient test for 
Texas was 4.05 * 10-24 and for Illinois it was 7.2 * 10-56, both indicating statistically significant 
relationships. Alternately, for visits per capita, there was no statistically significant relationship 
in Texas or Illinois, with p-values of 0.22 and 0.16, respectively. This indicates that, on a per 
capita basis, the relative SVI of a PWS does not seem to influence the quantity of regulator site 
visits.  
         The first potential anomaly with the Hypothesis 1 data set that deserved attention involved 
a potential data discrepancy associated with system size. SVI is related to number of site visits 
on an absolute basis in both states, and is simultaneously not related to per capita number of site 
visits in either state, indicating that there should be a relationship between population size and 
SVI. This is true in Illinois where the population served was directly proportional to SVI. 
However, in Texas, there was no relationship between SVI and population served. This anomaly 




          SVI was also compared to the total number of regulatory violations as well as the quantity 
of violations per capita. Higher-SVI systems received more violations in both Texas and Illinois, 
with p-values  from Pearson’s correlation coefficient test of 1.56 * 10-6 and 0.03, respectively. 
The split between Texas and Illinois with respect to violations per capita is a potential second 
anomaly with the Hypothesis 1 data set. In Texas, higher-SVI systems were more likely to 
receive regulatory violations on a per capita basis. In Illinois, there was no relationship between 
SVI and the number of violations per capita. In Texas and Illinois, the SVI to regulatory 
violation p-values from the Pearson’s correlation coefficient tests were, respectively, 0.02 and 
0.05.  The 0.05 p-value for Illinois was nearly low enough to indicate a relationship, which 
seems to resolve the apparent anomaly. A future study, with national-level data, would provide 
more conclusive findings.  
          There was a significant positive relationship between SVI and the number of contaminants 
exceeding EWG health guidelines in Illinois (p-value = 0.02). However, there was no such 
relationship in Texas (p-value = 0.14). There was no relationship between SVI and chloroform in 
either Illinois or Texas, with p-values of 0.33 and 0.98, respectively. Likewise, there was no 
relationship between SVI and levels of disinfection byproducts in either Illinois or Texas, with 
respective p-values of 1.01 and 0.41. In Texas, there was a positive relationship between levels 
of arsenic and SVI, with a p-value of 0.00. Alternately, in Illinois there was no relationship 
between SVI and arsenic, with a p-value of 0.09. There was a relationship between SVI and 
nitrate in both Illinois and Texas, with respective p-values of 0.01 and 0.00. 
         The third and fourth potential anomalies with the Hypothesis 1 data set related to why the 
Illinois and Texas data differed with respect to the relationship between SVI and both the 




significant relationship between SVI and number of contaminants exceeding health guidelines 
while there was no such relationship in Texas. Alternately, Texas experienced a relationship 
between SVI and arsenic while there was no such relationship in Illinois. The best method to 
explore these anomalies would be to conduct a future study utilizing national-level data.  
Hypothesis 2: Source Water Type vs Parameters 
Table 2 
Hypothesis Group 2:  Source Water Type v. Parameters 
 
Note. *Large systems serve 10,000 or more consumers. 
 The data indicated that there was no relationship between source water type and the 
parameters. In other words, source water type had no relationship to either regulatory violations 
or water quality. The absence of relationships was, in itself, an interesting finding. The absence 
of relationships indicated that modern administrative and technical systems are sufficient to 
overcome the increased challenges of treating surface water. These findings indicated that future 











Quantity reguator site visits All No None No None
Regulator site visits per capita All No None No None
Quantity regulatory violations All No None No None
Regulatory violations per capita All No None No None
Number of contaminants exceeding health guidelines Large* No None No None
Levels of arsenic Large* No None No None
Levels of chloroform Large* No None No None
Levels of nitrate Large* No None No None
Levels of disinfection byproducts Large* No None No None









Hypothesis 3: PWS System Size (population served) vs Parameters 
Table 3 
Hypothesis Group 3:  PWS System Size (measured by population served) v. Parameters 
 
Note. *Large systems serve 10,000 or more consumers. 
 The data showed that larger systems, measured by number of facilities, received more 
regulatory attention, in the form of site visits. P-values were 0.00 and 5.22 * 10-29 for Illinois and 
Texas, respectively. In addition, the quantity of site visits per capita were both statistically 
significant in Illinois and Texas, with p-values of 2.75 * 10-80 and 4.87 * 10-6, respectively. As 
would have been predicted by the literature, smaller systems received more regulatory attention 
on a per capita bases. The data does not indicate that further research into these relationships is 
warranted.  
 The data also indicated that there was no relationship between system size and SVI, with 
p-values of 0.76 and 0.23 for Illinois and Texas, respectively. Illinois data indicated a 
relationship between system size and regulatory violations on an absolute and per capita basis, 
with respective p-values of 1.77 * 10-6 and 6.39 * 10-46. As would have been predicted by the 
literature, smaller systems received more attention on a per capita basis. The first potential 







Quantity reguator site visits All Yes Proportional Yes Proportional
Regulator site visits per capita All Yes Inverse Yes Inverse
Number of violations All Yes Proportional No None
Number of violations per capita All Yes Inverse No None
SVI All No None No None
Number of contaminants exceeding health guidelines Large* No None Yes Proportional
Levels of arsenic Large* Yes Inverse No None
Levels of chloroform Large* No None No None
Levels of nitrate Large* No None No None












there were no relationships between system size and either the absolute number of violations or 
violations per capita, with p-values of 0.30 and 0.08, respectively. The potential anomaly could 
be resolved by future research that utilizes national-level data.  
 The data indicated that there were no relationships in Texas or Illinois between system 
size and chloroform, nitrate, or disinfection byproducts. However, as would be predicted by the 
qualitative literature, there was an inverse relationship with respect to arsenic in Illinois, with a 
p-value of 0.04. A second potential anomaly with the Hypothesis 3 data is that while this 
relationship existed in Illinois, there was no relationship between system size and arsenic in 
Texas. This potential anomaly could be resolved through future research that involves analyzing 
national-level data.  
 A third potential anomaly with Hypothesis 3 data was that there was a relationship 
between system size and number of contaminants exceeding health guidelines in Texas but not in 
Illinois, with p-values of 0.01 and 0.18, respectively. This anomaly could likely be resolved with 
future data utilizing national-level data. However, a more problematic fourth anomaly also 
presented itself with these same data points. The qualitative literature indicated that there should 
be fewer contaminants exceeding health guidelines in larger systems, while the data for Texas 
showed the opposite. A future study utilizing national-level data may provide some insight into 
this finding. However, the inconsistency with the qualitative literature also calls into question the 
reliability of the underlying data.  
   The underlying data came from a third-party non-profit organization that relies largely 
on publicly available data. It is possible that larger systems have more data available, which 
gives the appearance that more contaminants exceed guidelines. Smaller systems may therefore 




and that other factors may be contributing to increased levels of contaminants in the larger 
systems. For example, if industrial water contamination sources are more prevalent in larger 
communities, then it may contributed to decreased water quality.  
Hypothesis 4: PWS System Size (number of facilities) vs. Parameters 
Table 4 
Hypothesis Group 4:  PWS System Size (measured by number of facilities) v. Parameters 
 
Note. *Large systems serve 10,000 or more consumers. 
 System size, measured by the number of facilities, was proportional to the quantity of 
regulator site visits in both Illinois and Texas, with p-values of 0.00 and 9.88 * 10-132, 
respectively. In addition, the system size and regulator site visits per capita were inversely 
proportional in both Illinois and Texas, with p-values of 2.74 * 10-80 and 3.12 * 10-30, 
respectively.  These findings are consistent with what would be expected in accordance with the 
qualitative literature.  
A first potential anomaly for Hypothesis 4 appears because in Illinois there is a 
proportional relationship between system size and number of violations, with a p-value of 1.76 * 
10-6 while there is no statistical relationship in Texas, with a p-value of 0.61. This anomaly could 







Quantity reguator site visits All Yes Proportional Yes Proportional
Regulator site visits per capita All Yes Inverse Yes Inverse
Number of violations All Yes Proportional No None
Number of violations per capita All yes Inverse Yes Inverse
SVI All No None Yes Proportional
Number of contaminants exceeding health guidelines Large* Yes Proportional Yes Proportional
Levels of arsenic Large* No None No None
Levels of chloroform Large* No None No None
Levels of nitrate Large* Yes Inverse Yes Inverse












review of the qualitative literature, there is an inversely proportional relationship between system 
size and number of violations per capita in both states. P-values for Illinois and Texas were 6.39 
* 10-46 and 6.00 * 10-6, respectively. There was a proportional relationship between system size 
and SVI in Texas, with a p-value of 0.03, although there was no relationship in Illinois, with a p-
value of 0.76. This second potential anomaly, the difference in SVI relationships between Texas 
and Illinois, could likely be resolved by a future study utilizing national-level datasets.  
No relationships were identified between system size and arsenic, chloroform, or 
disinfection byproduct levels in either Texas or Illinois. There are statistically significant 
inversely proportional relationships in both Illinois and Texas between system size and nitrate 
levels. For nitrate levels, the p-value in Illinois is 0.01 and in Texas it is 0.02. In both Illinois and 
Texas there were significant relationships between system size and number of contaminants 
exceeding health guidelines. The p-value in Illinois was 0.02 and in Texas it was also 0.02. This 
data represents a third potential anomaly with Hypothesis 4 because the qualitative literature 
would predict that the relationship should be inversely proportional, rather than proportional. 
This could be because of problems with the underlying data. Alternately, it could indicate that 
previous assumptions regarding the relationship between system size and water quality could 
require revision.  
Discussion 
 This case study utilized a literature review and quantitative techniques to determine how 
to better engage in drinking water mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery. An extended 
literature review was able to identify technical and administrative guidance in the literature. Such 
guidance applies to different audiences, such as drinking water consumers, primacy agencies, 




study was able to elicit a determination as to whether the hypotheses discussed in the methods 
section were rejected or failed to be rejected.  
Technical and Administrative Guidance in the Literature 
 Bushe (2009) highlighted the need for successful organizational learning, in order to help 
“groups, large and small, learn from their collective experience (p. 19).”  Toward that goal, the 
literature included both technical and administrative guidance to water operators to promote 
resilient systems. The guidance related to mitigation, preparedness, and response. Technical and 
administrative guidance within the literature has the potential to serve as a basis for institutional 
knowledge that can be shared throughout the drinking water industry.  
Various authors have prepared a body of documents that provide technical guidance to 
the water industry. In particular, response-based documents were geared toward immediate 
actions after an incident presents itself. However, other technical guidance focused on mitigation 
and preparedness with an emphasis on administrative techniques. A survey of this literature may 
be utilized to better understand methods to reduce human health risks associated with drinking 
water systems.  
The concept of organizational learning is challenging when applied to an entire industry. 
The drinking water industry is much larger than individual stakeholders such as PWSs, 
regulators, or personnel. The federal government, as a stakeholder, is somewhat unique within 
the drinking water industry. The federal government serves multiple functions such as a 
knowledge repository, an issuer of regulations, and it also retains many enforcement and 
response authorities. Complicating the issue, in 49 states it is state governments that retain 
primacy for enforcement of the SDWA. In Flint, Michigan, state regulators were not successful 




knowledge gaps may reveal insight into knowledge-sharing functions and reveal gaps in 
knowledge.  
This study analyzed emergency management-related technical and administrative 
guidance from the literature geared toward different audiences. The audiences include the 
following:  drinking water consumers, primacy agencies, and states, local governments, and 
water systems. Drinking water consumers are the private citizens and businesses that utilize 
potable water from municipal sources. Primacy agencies are governmental entities that are 
responsible for enforcing the SDWA. States, local governments, and water systems are entities 
that are typically involved in the production and distribution of drinking water. The review 
presented below attempts to distill the key points of the literature for each audience.  
Drinking Water Consumers 
Private citizens are advised to store “at least one gallon per person, per day,” ideally to 
cover a two-week period (FEMA, 2004, p. 7). The stored water would be used during 
emergencies for both hydration and personal hygiene. Therefore, for example, a household of 
four could fulfill this requirement by having 25 cases of bottled water on hand, assuming 12-
ounce containers with 24 containers per case. Families may lower risk by storing water in a 
climate-controlled setting and ensuring stock rotation.  
Private citizens are also expected to follow all drinking water-related guidance from their 
purveyor and governmental authorities. A relatively common recommendation made to 
consumers is to boil water. Boiling water has the ability to reduce risk associated with microbial 
contamination. Such guidance may come in the form of an advisory or notice. The CDC (2016) 
published a guide that describes various phrases and types of communication that can be used to 




A 2021 winter storm in Texas highlighted a potential problem for consumers. In Austin, 
for example, a boil water notice was issued (Austin Water, n.d.). A challenge for many 
consumers across the state, many of whom were dealing with boil water orders, was that they 
also had no electricity available. Consumers had unlimited tap water, although they were 
required to boil it and did not have access to electricity. Alternate methods of water disinfection 
utilize household bleach, iodine tables, or calcium hypochlorite (Department of the Army 
Headquarters, 2015).  
The federal government has been instrumental in promulgating guidance for drinking 
water consumers during emergencies. EPA (2017) issued guidance for consumers on how to 
perform emergency disinfection of drinking water. The EPA also referred to a joint FEMA and 
American Red Cross publication titled Food and Water in an Emergency (2004). Additional 
guidance for consumers can be found in Appendix B of the Centers for Disease Control Drinking 
Water Advisory Communication Toolbox (2016). The technical aspects of water disinfection 
were generally consistent, although there were several issues that could potentially generate 
confusion.  
The first potential area of confusion is that the guidance documents do not clearly 
describe the authorities who may issue drinking water guidance. The EPA (2017) and FEMA 
(2004) recommend to seek guidance from “local authorities (p. 1, p. 11).”  This can be confusing 
because two separate types of entities may issue drinking water notifications:  federal, state, or 
local officials with emergency authorities or public or private officials that own or operate a 
regulated PWS. When the EPA and FEMA direct consumers to check with local authorities, it is 
likely that not all consumers will understand the difference between local officials and water 




to check with two different sets of local authorities prior to making a conclusion regarding their 
water?  Federal, state, and officials have responsibility over the whole community, including 
consumers of PWSs, while water purveyors are only responsible for their own customers. 
Additionally, most communities have some non-PWSs and many have multiple regulated PWSs.  
The second potential area of confusion associated with federal guidance is that the 
referenced documents did not delineate between declared emergencies and routine governmental 
operations. The vast majority of drinking water incidents that result in public notification are not 
declared emergencies. Until 2016, the United States had never declared a federal emergency 
primarily related to drinking water (FEMA, n.d.). The bifurcated communication channels have 
potential to sow confusion. One communication channel flows through governmental entities 
with jurisdiction over the area in question. The second communication channel flows through the 
water purveyor, which may be a private company. During declared emergencies, these 
communication channels are ideally streamlined. However, during declared emergencies, advice 
for consumers may differ depending on their water purveyor—users of household wells may 
need to follow different advice than users of a municipal water system.  
The third potential area of confusion associated with federal guidance is that advice to 
consumers to disinfect and treat water at home is disjointed and incomplete. According to the 
CDC, there are four types of notifications from a PWS to the public: informational, boil water, 
do not drink, and do not use (CDC, 2016). However, EPA (2017) provided guidance on 
“disinfection (p.1)” of water while FEMA (2004) discussed both “disinfection” and “treatment” 
(p. 10).  Although FEMA advised that treatment is recommended in addition to disinfection, no 




boil water notices and disinfection, as would have been applicable in the 2021 Texas snowstorm, 
when many residents had no viable methods to boil water.  
Business and private organizations also have unique challenges associated with water 
disruptions, particularly as related to food operations. The resources and planning required for 
continuity of operations for business is much more complex than for individuals or families. 
Preparation for such eventualities may be accomplished through formal programs, such as the 
National Fire Protection Association Standard 1600, Standard on Continuity, Emergency, and 
Crisis Management (NFPA, 2019). Whether formal or ad hoc processes are used in response, 
compliance with boil water orders is mandatory. This may require the use of licensed potable 
drinking water tanker trucks, utilization of pre-washed fruits and vegetables, and increased use of 
hand sanitizer (Houston Health Department, n.d.).  
Primacy Agencies 
Drinking water production is an established industry in the United States and around the 
world. An assumption could be made that municipal professional engineers and commercial 
vendors that install drinking water systems could be relied upon to install safe systems. In the 
present, the oversight of new drinking water treatment facilities requires skilled review of 
proposed designs. Several instances of failure of regulators to assure oversight in the design 
review of new treatment systems have been documented in the literature.  
The first example of problems in the design review of a new treatment system occurred at 
the Fort Belknap Indian Community (FBIC) Drinking Water Treatment Plant. The tribal 
government did not have primacy for SDWA enforcement, which made the EPA the primary 
enforcement agency (EPA, 2013a). In 2007, the FBIC submitted plans for a new system, to the 




review. Multiple problems were identified with the design review, and the EPA notified the 
FBIC of the issues. In 2009, $572,700 in federal funds associated with the ARRA were provided 
for the project, even though the problems identified by the EPA contractors were not addressed 
(EPA, 2013a). Upon completion of the project, the plant was not able to maintain “compliance 
with the SDWA, specifically the Disinfection Byproduct Rule” (EPA, 2013a, p. 3).    
The Flint, Michigan disaster in 2015 represents the second example of a primacy agency 
failing to detect design flaws in a treatment system prior to a plant beginning operations. Paine 
and Kushma (2016) stated the “Office of the Michigan attorney general…asserts that Flint’s 
external water experts inaccurately declared the system to be operating in compliance with the 
law and that a Department of Environmental Quality employee also fraudulently certified the 
Flint water treatment plant (p. 5).”  The state government, as primacy agency, had a duty to 
review plans for the proposed system. Failure to provide a sufficient technical review of a system 
prior to certification is an error of omission.  
The two cited examples were both compounded failures. In each case, technical experts 
working on behalf of a local municipal entity provided poor quality designs. In the FBIC 
example, the primacy agency acknowledged they did not have sufficient technical capacity to 
review the design and therefore contracted out the review. The contracted review accurately 
detected problems, although the problems were not corrected prior to funding and completing the 
project. Alternately, in Flint Michigan, the state never detected the design flaws in the proposal 
submitted by the municipality. There was nothing inherently improper about using the Flint 
River as a source of drinking water. However, certifying an improperly designed treatment plant 





States, Local Governments, and Water Systems 
 States, local governments, and individual water systems have similar community-wide 
opportunities to seek mitigation projects associated with drinking water. These entities have the 
ability to collaborate to utilize a variety of federal funding and finance options. Federal options 
include: “the EPA’s Drinking Water State Revolving Loan Fund, the Water Infrastructure 
Improvements for the Nation Act grant programs, and the Water Infrastructure Finance and 
Innovation Act financing program, as well as HUD’s Community Development Block Grants” 
(Wheeler & Carson, 2019, p.1).   
Conclusions 
 This case study sought to identify how emergency managers can improve risk reduction 
efforts associated with drinking water infrastructure through analysis of practices and meta-data 
within the emergency management literature. A qualitative review of the literature elicited 
techniques for different audiences to improve risk reduction efforts. The targeted audience 
includes drinking water consumers, primacy agencies, and states, local governments, and water 
systems. In addition, quantitative data from three databases was compiled and analyzed to search 
for relationships. The existing literature had presented largely qualitative assessments of such 
relationships. This case study involved quantitative analysis of PWS-related relationships. The 
most significant conclusions are presented below.  
 The most significant aspect of this study is that it documents an initial methodology that 
enables a quantitative analysis of PWS performance. In contrast, previous studies have largely 
focused on qualitative analysis. This case study presents comprehensive data for two states. 
Although some interesting conclusions could be drawn from the data, it is apparent that the first 




developed and analyzed. A second future step would be to publish this methodology in a peer-
reviewed publication in order to gain feedback on the procedures and to solicit potential 
improvements to the methodology. Increasing the underlying dataset to include national-level 
data and improving the methodology through academic collaboration would result in 
improvements.  
 A third technique to improve the methodology, although implausible, would be to enact a 
national requirement for PWSs to centrally upload all of their water sampling data. This case 
study relied upon a database developed by an independent non-profit organization that collects 
sampling data from PWSs. It is possible that larger systems are more likely to make their data 
publicly available, which would mean they disproportionally have their negative attributes 
documented. Do smaller systems have fewer problems, or are they simply not publicized as 
well?  The EWG cannot be faulted if their data is imperfect—they are independently funded and 
have limited resources. If this country would like to better assess its PWS performance, it would 
not be necessary to mandate any new water sampling. Instead, it could mandate PWSs to upload 
mandatory sample results to a central data repository. Such a requirement would still be 
expensive, even though it would not require any additional water sampling. 
 In general terms, the quantitative portion of this study indicated that source water type is 
not a factor with respect to PWS performance while SVI and system size are factors. A summary 
of these findings is qualitatively presented in Table 5 below. In Table 5, the nomenclature PWS 
performance is a term that includes both regulatory violations and negative water quality 
indicators. The results presented in Table 5 indicated that source water type does not have a 
significant influence on PWS performance indicators. Increased SVI, however, was shown to be 




systems, measured based on number of facilities or population served, resulted in more 
regulatory violations per capita. Although the data indicated a relationship between system size 
and negative water quality indicators, the directionality of the results was mixed. Some data 
indicated larger systems have more negative water quality indicators while other data indicated 
the opposite. Significantly, all data in Table 5, except as noted with respect to system size versus 
negative water quality indicators, was consistent with what would have been predicted based 
upon a qualitative literature review.   
Table 5 
Summary of Quantitative Data Conclusions 
 
Note. *Differs from predictions based on qualitative literature review. 
 The most definitive aspect of the quantitative data review was that source water type was 
not related to PWS performance or negative outcomes. The literature opened the possibility that 
surface water may present more opportunities for increased violations or decreased water quality. 
However, there appeared to be no such relationships. These results indicate that future research 
should focus on either PWS size or SVI. The fact that source water type is a non-factor with 
respect to PWS outcomes is an indicator that the water industry is been able to effectively 
overcome the increased challenges associated with the treatment of surface water.  
Regulatory Violations
Negative Water Quality 
Indicators
Source Water Type No N/A N/A
SVI Yes
Yes (Higher SVI = more 
violations)
Yes (Higher SVI = lower 
quality)
System Size Yes
Yes (Smaller size = more 
violations per capita) Varies*









 The data from both Texas and Illinois indicated that elevated SVI resulted in increased 
regulatory violations. In addition, in Illinois’ elevated SVI was related to both an increased 
number of contaminants exceeding health guidelines and increased levels of nitrate. In Texas, 
elevated SVI was related to increased levels of both arsenic and nitrate. Therefore, the data 
indicated that elevated SVI is related to both increases in regulatory violations and lower 
indicators of water quality. Expanding the study to include national-level data would generate 
increased face validity of these results.  
 A future expansion of the underlying data set would need to occur in two separate 
directions. First, all states territories, and tribal lands would need to be represented. Second, all 
negative water quality indicators, not just the five used in this study, would need to be 
incorporated. Prior to building out the dataset, the methodology should be subjected to peer 
review. It is highly plausible that peer review would result in improved techniques for expanding 
the data set.  
 System size, measured by either number of facilities or population served, is likely to 
result in an increased number of regulatory violations per capita. However, the data was not as 
straightforward with respect to negative water quality indicators. The data did indicate a 
relationship between system size and negative water quality indicators. However, the 
directionality of the results was mixed. For example, some data indicated that larger systems 
have more problems, while other data indicated that smaller systems have more problems. As 
previously suggested in this case study, the problem could be a result of data availability 
problems associated with smaller systems. Additional research would need to be conducted to 




 Lastly, the quantitative findings of this study had no significant bearing on Flint, 
Michigan or the ability to predict future similar scenarios in the future. The emergency 
declaration in Flint in 2016 occurred during a change-over in the water source for a major city. 
That is an extremely rare event, as major cities do not frequently change their water sources. The 
quantitative findings, however, can shed light on the impact of SVI on negative PWS outcomes 
during routine operations. PWSs in locations with elevated SVI can be assessed using the 
methodology outlined in this case study. In the future, major engineering projects, such as the 
one that occurred in Flint, Michigan require increased attention. The qualitative, not the 
quantitative, portions of this case study may shed light on some potential risk reduction 
opportunities. For example, this case study presented an example (other than Flint, Michigan) 
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